THEORY OF BEING

⊕ The Metaphysics, as it exists now, is divided into fourteen books named according to the letters of the Greek alphabet.

Book I: Alpha (Α)
Book II: little Alpha (α)
Book III: Beta (Β)
Book IV: Gamma (Γ)
Book V: Delta (Δ)
Book VI: Epsilon (Ε)
Book VII: Zeta (Ζ)
Book VIII: Eta (Η)
Book IX: Theta (Θ)
Book X: Iota (Ι)
Book XI: Kappa (Κ)
Book XII: Lambda (Λ)
Book XIII: Mu (Μ)
Book XIV: Nu (Ν).

The title (τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, "the books after the physical treatises") was imposed by a later editor. It refers to the position of the Metaphysics within the arrangement of books within Aristotelian corpus as it has come down to us.

The Metaphysics appears to be put together from different works. Books II, V, XI, and XII seem to be later additions. Books VII and VIII appear to be the beginning of a new work, not a continuation from Book I. The Metaphysics comes after physical works and before the ethical works. The subject in the physical works is second philosophy. In the Metaphysics, it is first philosophy.

Aristotle identifies first philosophy with theology. In doing this, he is making a claim in ontology. He is making a claim about what he describes as "being as being."

An example helps to make Aristotle's idea a little clearer.

We can think shadows exist. This puts them in our ontology, but we can also think they depend for their existence on other things. We can think that although human beings, for example, can exist without casting shadows, the shadows human beings cast could not exist if human beings did not exist. We can think this shows that existence for shadows is being in a relation to something more basic, and we can think there must be things whose existence is not dependent in this way. For Aristotle, divine beings have this ontological status.

(The word "ontology" comes from the Latin word ontologia. We might expect there to be a corresponding Greek word, but there is not. The Latin word was introduced to mean "account of being" as if it were from a Greek word whose parts are ὄντος (present-tense participle of the verb εἰμί ("I am") and λόγος ("account")). The intention seems to have been to model the Latin word on existing Greek compound words such as θεολογία ("theology" = θεός ("divine") and λόγος ("account")). The first known occurrence of ontologia is in 1606 CE.)

Substance and the Ways of Being

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"If there is no substance other than those naturally composed, physics will be the primary kind of knowledge; but if there is some immutable substance, it is prior and universal because it is primary. Its study would be first philosophy and would be the study of being as being, both what it is and what the attributes are which belong to it as being" (Metaphysics VI.1.1026a).

"Being is said in many ways.... Being signifies the what it is and some this (τί ἐστι καὶ τόδε τι) and the quality or quantity or any other such category. Being is said in these ways, but it is evident that primary among them is the what it is, for this signifies the substance (for when we say what quality something is, we say that it is good or bad, not three-cubits or man, but when we say what it is, we say man or god, not pale or hot or three-cubits), and the other things are all said to be because some are quantities of what is [a substance], others are qualities, others again affections, still others something else" (Metaphysics VII.1.1028a).

"We must consider what things are substances; and whether there are any besides the sensibles, or not; and how these substances exist; and whether there is any separable substance, and if so, why and how, or none besides the sensibles" (Metaphysics VII.2.1028b). A human being, for Aristotle, has a certain way of being. It exists as a "substance" (οὐσία).

Substance is the traditional translation of οὐσία in this context, but this can be misleading. We tend to use the word substance for water and other stuffs we refer to with mass nouns, but Aristotle thinks that human beings, cats, dogs, and so on, are substances too.

Aristotle thinks that other things have ways of being different from the way of substances. Pale exists as what he calls a "quality." Three-cubits exists as a "quantity."

(A πήχυς ("cubit") is the length from the elbow to the tip of the middle finger.)

Substances, though, according to Aristotle, have the most fundamental way of being. There would be no qualities, for example, if there were no substances to have qualities.

Aristotle also thinks that substances themselves differ in their ways of being.

One way of being for a substance is being a form in matter. We saw in this in the Physics, but being a form in matter is not the primary way of being a substance. For Aristotle, the way of being of the gods (the divine beings) is the primary way of being a substance.

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First Philosophy is Universal

Aristotle thinks that the explanation of the divine way of being in theology and first philosophy is "universal" and thus explains what "being as being" is.

To begin to see what Aristotle has in mind, it helps to imagine what he would think first philosophy is if the first unmovable mover and other gods did not exist.

Because there would be no objects for theology to study, it would not be about anything real. Sensible substances would exist and be the object of study in physics. Mathematics would study the magnitudes (measurable quantities) that must exist if sensible substances exist. In this ontology, physics, not mathematics, would be first philosophy and "universal" because as part of the explanation of the being of sensible substances, physics would explain the being of the magnitudes mathematics studies and that the existence of sensible substances entails.

Aristotle thinks that the gods do exist. So, as he understands reality, theology is first philosophy. The existence of divine beings entails that there are the sensible substances physics studies, and because as first philosophy it is "universal," Aristotle thinks that theology explains the being of sensible substances as part of its explanation of divine being.

In the Metaphysics, Aristotle takes steps to work out this explanation.

Being a Substance

⊕ To work out the "universal" explanation in first philosophy, Aristotle has to know what the way of being of the first unmovable mover and the other divine beings is.

⊕ "We have said in outline what substance is, that it is not predicated of a subject, but is a subject of which the other things are predicated. But we cannot say this alone, for it is not enough. It is obscure and makes matter substance. ... and it seems that matter cannot be substance; for separate (χωριστὸν) and a this (τόδε τι) seem to belong especially to substance. Hence it would seem that the form and the combination of form and matter are substance more than matter is. The substance, then, which consists of both—I mean of matter and form—may be dismissed, since it is posterior and obvious. Matter too is in a sense evident. We must investigate the third, [the form (εἶδος),] for [whether] this [meets the conditions for being a substance] is the most perplexing" (Metaphysics VII.3.1029a).

οὐσία = τόδε τι + ὑποκείμενον + χωριστὸν

Aristotle dismisses "matter" (ὕλη) as only potentially "a this." The "combination of form and matter" is a this and so is "substance more than matter is," but it is "separate" only with qualification (separate only in account) and so does not strictly meet the conditions for being a substance. This is a problem for him in the Metaphysics because he is puzzled about substance.

Aristotle thinks that three things are true of a substance. (i) It is a "this" that we can say is a man, for example, when we say what the "this" is. (ii) It is a "subject" for the accidents we can predicate of a man. (iii) It is a "separate" from these accidents because it can exist without them. The man can be pale, but being pale is accidental to being a man.

What is puzzling for Aristotle, and what he works hard in the central books of the Metaphysics to understand, is whether anything can be a "this," a "subject," and "separate."

The conclusion he reaches is uncertain, as the Metaphysics is one of the more difficult works in Ancient philosophy, but his view seems to be that forms meet these conditions.

This can be confusing. We have already seen that in his Physics and second philosophy, Aristotle talks about forms in matter. This can temp us to think that he takes himself to understand the existence of forms and forms in matter. This, though, is not true. He thinks that second philosophy accepts these notions without thinking much about them. Working out the puzzles with them is the business of first philosophy to worry about.

We will not follow the details of Aristotle's investigation in first philosophy, but we can get some insight into his thought if we consider why he abandons his earlier ontology in the Categories. This will help us understand why he is puzzled about whether anything can be a substance and why he thinks it is worth investigating whether forms are substances.

Perseus Digital Library

Aristotle, Metaphysics

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon

ἀπορία, aporia, noun, "a perplexity"
ἄπορος, aporos, adjective, "lack of passage"
ἀπορωτάτη is a superlative of ἄπορος. A πόρος is a "means of passing." The alpha (α) is privative.
οὐσία, ousia, noun, "substance"

The noun οὐσία derives from a participle of the verb εἰμί (whose first-person meaning is "I am, I exist"). The infinitive of εἰμί is εἶναι ("to be"). The present participles are ὤν (masculine), οὖσα (feminine), ὄν (neuter).

In the context of Aristotle's metaphysics, οὐσία traditionally translates as "substance" because οὐσία in this context was translated into Latin as substantia (which literally translates ὑπόστασις ("standing under")).

ποιός, adjective, "of a certain kind or quality"
ποιότης, noun, "quality"
ὑπόστασις, hypostasis, noun, "standing under, supporting"


Charlton T. Lewis, Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary

immutabilis, adjective, "unchangeable, unalterable, immutable"

qualitas, noun, "quality"

Cicero creates the word qualitas to render ποιότης, "of-what-sort-ness," a term Plato had Socrates introduce in the Theaetetus. ποιότης is formed from the interrogative ποῖος ("of what kind?") and the noun-forming suffix -της. Cicero took qualis and added the suffix to form qualitas. "[I]f I may use the term, ‘quality’—as we are dealing with unusual subjects you will of course allow us occasionally to employ words never heard before, as do the Greeks themselves, who have now been handling these topics for a long time" (Cicero, Academica I.VI.24).

quantitas, noun, "quantity." ποσότης = πόσος ("how much?") + -της.

substantia, noun, "under-standing-ness" or "that which stands under."
An accidens (singular of accidentia) is that which "falls upon" that which stands under.
τò συμβεβηκός. συμβαίνω = συμ ("with") + βαίνω ("walk")
Human, for Socrates, is the substance. His συμβεβηκότα (accidents) "walk with"/"fall upon" this substance.

"Traditionally [in certain contexts in Aristotle the noun] οὐσία has been rendered by 'substance.' The reason for this is that, on the view Aristotle puts forward in the Categories, properties depend for their being on objects in that objects are their ultimate subjects, they are what ultimately underlies everything else. Indeed, objects in the Categories are characterized by the very fact that they are the ultimate subjects which underlie everything, whereas there is nothing that underlies them as their subject. It is because of this characterization that the rendering 'substance' seems appropriate" (Michael Frede, "Substance in Aristotle's Metaphysics," 73. Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 72-80).

"Aristotle in [Metaphysics] E [Book VI, chapter] 1, 1026a23 ff. raises the question of whether first philosophy is universal rather than just concerned with with a particular domain of reality, namely divine substances. And the suggested answer seems to be that first philosophy does not just deal with a particular domain of of objects, but is universal, because it is first. Thus, if there were no separate immaterial substances, physics would be first, but for this very reason physics would not just deal with a particular domain, namely sensible substances, but would be universal in dealing in some way with everything there is. ... If there were no immaterial separate substances, we would have two theoretical sciences or rather bodies of sciences, physics and mathematics, the one concerned with sensible substances, the other with magnitudes. Now physics would be universal in the sense that, though its domain does not include magnitudes, it would nevertheless have to say something about magnitudes. For it is a crucial feature of sensible substances that they are of some magnitude and that they come in kinds and form classes which are of some magnitude. One would have to form a view as to what it is to be a magnitude, as to why there have to be magnitudes for there to be sensible substance, as to what kinds of magnitudes one has to assume" (Michael Frede, "Introduction," 8. Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda, 1-52).

"[W]e shall want the substance of an object to be such that with reference to it we can explain how, despite all the changes, it is the history of one object. We also think an object might have had a history quite different from the one it actually had yet have been the same object; this, too, is to be explained in terms of substance. Furthermore, the substance must be an individual, since we are looking for the real individuals in the category of substance which are to explain the individuality of ordinary individual objects [the human beings, the cats and dogs, and so on]. Finally, there must be some sort of asymmetry between substances and properties, on the basis of which we can say of properties and everything else that exists that they depend on substances for their existence, but that substances do not, in any way, depend on properties for their existence. These are the requirements Aristotle lays down in the Metaphysics, when he says a substance must be a subject (ὑποκείμενον), 'a this' (τόδε τι), and an independently existing entity (χωριστὸν)" (Michael Frede, "Individuals in Aristotle,"" 64-65. Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 49-71).

"Aristotle ... recognizes three sciences or sets of sciences, namely theology, physics, and mathematics, except that he thinks that mathematics deals with objects which are posterior to natural substances in that they are quantities, rather than substances, whereas the objects of theology and of physics are substances. In any case, Aristotle thinks that these are particular sciences, dealing with a particular genus of beings with principles peculiar to them, the sort of sciences Aristotle discusses in the Posterior Analytics. But when we come to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, it is clear from the very first two chapters of Metaphysics Λ that Aristotle now is looking for a science for which no provision is made in the Posterior Analytics, namely a universal science, a science of all beings and their ultimate principles. Similarly at the beginning of Metaph. I Aristotle claims that the science he is trying to develop is not to be identified with any of the particular sciences which deal just with part of reality, part of what there is, because it is universal. And he next, in I.2, explains how such a universal science is possible, since he himself at an earlier stage seems to have thought that it was impossible, because there is no such thing as the genus of beings, since beings radically differ from each other as beings. He now explains that beings, though they do not form a genus, form a family in that they are either beings because they are substances, or beings because they are related to substances in a certain way, as, for instance, colour is a being in being a quality of a certain kind of substance. ‘Being’ then, is predicated of things not homonymously, but with reference to one and the same thing (πρὸς ἕν), namely substance. A colour, for instance, is a being, because it is a quality of a substance ⊕   [About dialectic, t]his no one will maintain in dispute against us that there is any other way of inquiry that attempts systematically and in all cases to determine what each thing really is. But all the other arts have for their object the opinions and desires of men or are wholly concerned with generation and composition or with the service and tendance of the things that grow and are put together, while the remnant which we said did in some sort lay hold on reality—geometry and the studies that accompany it are, as we see, dreaming about being, but the clear waking vision of it is impossible for them as long as they leave the assumptions which they employ undisturbed and cannot give any account of them. For where the starting-point is something that the reasoner does not know, and the conclusion and all that intervenes is a tissue of things not really known, what possibility is there that assent in such cases can ever be converted into knowledge?
  None, Socrates.
  Then is not dialectic the only inquiry that advances in this manner, doing away with hypotheses, up to the first principle itself in order to find confirmation there? And it is true that when the eye of the soul is sunk in the barbaric slough, dialectic gently draws it forth and leads it up, employing as helpers and co-operators in this conversion the studies and knowledge which we enumerated, which we called knowledge from habit, though they really need some other designation, connoting more clearness than opinion and more obscurity than knowledge. Thought (διάνοιαν), I believe, was the term we employed. But I presume we shall not dispute about the name when things of such moment lie before us for consideration.
  Of course not, just as long as they express the state of clarity the soul possesses.
  It will be satisfactory, then, to do what we did before and call the first knowledge (ἐπιστήμην), the second (διάνοιαν), the third trust (πίστιν ), and the fourth imagination (εἰκασίαν). The last two together we call belief (δόξαν), the other two, intellection (νόησις). Belief is concerned with becoming; intellection with being. And as being is to becoming, so intellection is to belief; and as intellection is to belief, so knowledge is to belief and thought to imagination. But as for the ratios between the things these deal with, and the division of either the believable or the intelligible section into two, let’s pass them by, Glaucon, in case they involve us in discussions many times longer than the ones we have already gone through" (Republic VII.533a) which is a being in a more basic way or sense, since colours only exist because there are substances for them to be the colours of. Now, given that beings form a family of this kind, Aristotle also can explain how there can be one science of them. ... [I]f we look at the physical or natural substances we are familiar with from our surroundings, substances which are subject to coming into being and passing away, we notice that among their causes apart from their internal principles, matter and form, are also external principles which are substances of a sort which differ as substances from physical substances like trees and birds. There are the planets, in particular the sun, which maintain the cycle of generation and corruption. They must be eternal and hence are only material in the limited sense that they can be in the different places they move through in eternally taking their course. Still, since they are perceptible and move, they, like sublunary substances, fall into the domain of physics. But they in turn presuppose completely immaterial and hence imperceptible and unchanging beings, intellects, first among them the first unmoved mover, God. He is the ultimate being in terms of which all other beings have to be understood as beings to the extent that they presuppose him. These immaterial transcendent intellects—God the first among them—are the objects, or at least the primary objects, of theology. Metaphysics, then, provides us with a general understanding of reality as a whole, covering the objects of the different domains of the different particular sciences, insofar as they are beings, and, in doing so, revealing the hierarchical structure of reality according to which beings at a lower level depend for their being on the more basic beings at the higher level. If we ask why Aristotle was interested in such a universal science, part of the answer, given the beginning of the Metaphysics, must be that he thought that true theoretical wisdom involved not just knowing a great deal about different things, or, for that matter, the whole of the mathematical sciences and of physics, but a general understanding of reality as a whole and how its different parts hang together. But if we turn to Metaph. E, we see that there was another reason, too. When we look at the Posterior Analytics and ask how we know the principles of a particular science, in particular the principles peculiar to it, for instance the nature of a line in the case of geometry, given that the principles of the science cannot be proved, let alone by the science itself, we get the answers that they are immediately known by the intellect, and at the end, in [Posterior Analytics] B.19 [where Aristotle explains the process in terms of a battle metaphor], we get a brief, confusing account of how we might get to know them. But in Metaph. E.1 we at the beginning are not just told again that metaphysics, the science of being qua being, differs from all particular dianoetic theoretical sciences in that these just deal with they are a particular genus or kind of being, but also that they merely assume or rely on a hypothesis concerning the nature of the objects they are dealing with, just as Plato had assumed in Republic 7 the mathematicians do. And just as Plato had assumed that the hypotheses mathematics relies on only will become fully known and understood by dialectic or philosophy in the light of a first principle, so Aristotle now seems to assume that we will only fully know and understand the principles of physics and mathematics, if not of theology itself, in the light of his metaphysics which puts at least severe constraints on the sorts of beings particular sciences can hypothesize as their objects. In fact, I take it that Aristotle’s metaphysical enterprise of a universal science of beings qua beings and their principles is very much inspired by Plato’s remarks in the Republic about dialectic or philosophy" (Michael Frede, "Syrianus on Aristotle’s Metaphysics." Reprinted in Essays in Later Ancient Philosophy, edited by Boys-Stones and Karamanolis. 254-256).