THE END OF OUR ACTIONS

⊕ The Aristotelian corpus contains two works on ethics: the Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics.

These titles seem to refer respectly to Aristotle's friend (Eudemus of Rhodes) and to his son (Nicomachus).

Books IV, V, and VI of the Eudemian Ethics are identical to Books V, VI, and VII of the Nicomachean Ethics.

It is traditionally thought that the Eudemian Ethics is earlier.


An Outline of the Nicomachean Ethics:

NE I.I.1094a.                     The best good
NE I.1097b-I.1098a.         The argument from function
NE I.1102a-II.1109b.        Virtue and the soul
NE III.1109b-1115a.         Necessary conditions for virtue
NE III.1115a-IV.1128b.    Virtues of character
NE V.1129a-1138b.           Justice
NE VI.1138b-1145a.         Virtues of thought
NE VII.1145a-1154b.        Continence, pleasure
NE VIII.1155a-IX.1172a.  Friendship
NE X.1172a-1181b.            Pleasure, happiness, legislation


  "Polus and I, if you recollect, decided [Gorgias 468c] that everything we do should be for the sake of what is good. Do you, Callicles, agree with us in this view—that the good is the end of all our actions, and it is for its sake that all other things should be done, and not it for theirs? Do you add your vote to ours, and make a third?
  I do, Socrates" (Gorgias 499e).

"[The science of politics] ... ordains which sciences are to exist in states, and what branches of knowledge the different classes of the citizens are to learn, and up to what point they are to learn them.... As the rest of the sciences are employed by this one, and as it lays down laws for what people shall do and refrain from doing, the end of this science must include the ends of all the others and so will be the human good" (Nicomachean Ethics I.1.1094a). "As far as the name goes, we may almost say that the great majority of mankind are agreed about this; for both the multitude and persons of refinement speak of it as happiness, and conceive of living well and doing well as the same thing as being happy. But what constitutes happiness is a matter of dispute; and the popular account of it is not the same as that given by the philosophers" (Nicomachean Ethics I.2.1095a).

"To say that the best good is happiness will probably appear a truism; we still require a more explicit account of what this good is and thus what constitutes happiness. Perhaps we may arrive at this account by ascertaining the function (ἔργον) of man" (Nicomachean Ethics I.6.1097b).

"Life seems common even to plants, but we are seeking what is special to man. So let us exclude the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would be a life of perception, but this also seems common to the horse, the ox, and every animal. The remaining possibility is a life of action of the [part of the soul] having reason (πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος)" (Nicomachean Ethics I.6.1097b). Aristotle begins his discussion in the Nicomachean Ethics with the idea that we should conceive of ourselves as seeking to live a life that possesses what he calls the "best good."

"Every art and every discipline, and likewise every action and choice, seems to seek some good; that is why some people were right to describe the good as what everything seeks. ... If, then, the things achievable by action have some end we wish for because of itself, and we wish for other things because of this, ... then this end will be the good, that is to say, the best good. Then does knowledge of it carry great weight for our way of life, and if we know, we are more like archers who have a target to aim at, to hit the right mark? If so, we should try to grasp, in outline at least, what this good is [in a human life]" (Nicomachean Ethics I.2.1094a).

When Aristotle says that "some people were right to describe the good as what everything seeks," he may have Plato in mind. In the Gorgias, Socrates makes this point about the good for human beings. He gets Polus and Callicles to agree that the good is the end of our actions.

How Aristotle Proceeds

Aristotle, too, like Plato, thinks that it is important to know what the best good is because without this knowledge we are like archers aiming at the wrong target.

To get this knowledge, and thus to give us the right target, Aristotle works through what we are saying about a human life when we say that it possesses the best good.

The Human Function

Aristotle's first step is to note that the best good is itself "happiness" (εὐδαιμονία).

There are various things people try to have in their lives, but Aristotle says that most people believe on reflection that happiness is the good it benefits them most to possess.

This takes us forward one small step in the inquiry. It takes us to the conclusion that

• the best good is happiness.

We get this far but no further because the general agreement that the best good is happiness does not tell us what a human being is doing when he is happy.

⊕
  "The soul, has it a function (ἔργον) which you couldn't accomplish with anything else in the world, as for example, to manage things, rule, deliberation, and the like, is there anything else than soul to which you could rightly assign these and say that they were its peculiar work?
  Nothing else, Socrates" (Republic I.353d).

  "The just soul and the just man then will live well and the unjust badly?
  So it appears by your reasoning, Socrates.
  But surely he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who does not the contrary.
  Of course.
  Then the just is happy and the unjust miserable.
  So be it, Socrates" (Republic I.353e). To move forward, Aristotle turns to an idea in the Republic. The happy are those who live well, and we can identify them if we know what the "function" of a human being is.

The human function is how humans as a species behave. It is what goes on in a life someone lives insofar as he is human. Aristotle takes this human functioning to be

• "action of the part of the soul having reason."

This functioning defines the possible lives a human being can live. These lives are each some life or other in which the actions are a function of the part of the soul having reason.

The Argument from Function

Which of these possible human lives with the best good and thus with happiness? ⊕
"Do the carpenter and the leather worker have their functions and actions, but a human being does not? Is he by nature idle, without any function? Or, just as eye, hand, foot, and, in general, every [bodily] part has it function, may we likewise ascribe to a human being some function apart from all of these" (Nicomachean Ethics I.7.1097b).

The Greek word ἔργον translated as "function" here also means "work." So, to use Aristotle's example, the carpenter has a "function" or "work" that consists in using a set of skills he has learned to perform to bring about certain ends.

Aristotle, with Plato in his background, thinks the lives with happiness are the lives in which the human being living the life is performing the human function well. He does not set out an argument for this conclusion, but we can construct one from these premises:

• a human life with happiness is a life of a good human being
• a good human being is one who performs the human function well

⊕ It remains now to understand what goes on in the life of a human being who performs the human function well, and this requires us to know in more detail how Aristotle understands

• what "action of the part of the soul having reason" is
• what it is for a human being to perform this "action" well

Since the answer to this first question is long, we take up the second question first.

Function and Virtue

⊕ "If the function of man is a certain life, and that this is an activity and action of the soul with reason (ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου), and that the good of man is to do this well and beautifully, and that if a function is completed well when it is completed in accord with its proper virtue, then the good of man is the activity of his soul in conformity with virtue, or if there are several virtues, in conformity with the best and most complete (τελειοτάτην). Moreover, to be happy takes a complete lifetime. Just as one swallow or fine day does not make spring, one day or a brief period does not make a man blessed and happy" (Nicomachean Ethics I.6.1098a).

The noun ἐνέργεια is formed from ἐν ("in") and ἔργον ("function" or "work"). A standard translation is 'activity.'

τελειοτάτην is a superlative form of the adjective τέλειος.

The first meaning of τέλειος in the intermediate LS Greek dictionary is "having reached its end, finished, complete."

The translator in the Perseus Digital Library translates τελειοτάτην in the above passage as "most perfect." Things perform their function well only if they have their proper virtue or virtues. Knives must be sharp, balanced, and so on. Without these properties, they do not cut well.

Because Aristotle thinks that human lives with the best good are lives of performing "action of the part of the soul having reason" well, he concludes that "the good of man" is

• "the activity of the soul in conformity with virtue, or if there are
several virtues, in conformity with the best and most complete."

The "activity of the soul" is "action of the part of the soul having reason." If someone has the virtue or virtues proper to this "activity," he achieves the best good if he is not impeded.

To understand this more clearly, we need to begin with how Aristotle understands

• "the part of the soul having reason"

and what he thinks

• the virtues proper to this part of the soul are

In his answers to these questions, Aristotle reverses the order in the Republic. Whereas Socrates identifies justice as the virtue of the soul and then identifies the parts of the soul, Aristotle begins with the parts of the soul and then goes on to identify their virtues.

The Parts of the Soul

⊕ "We have discussed this sufficiently in our popular discourses (ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις), and we should use this discussion. We have said that one part is without reason (ἄλογον) and that one has reason (λόγον ἔχον)" (Nicomachean Ethics I.13.1102a).

The human soul =
        1. part having reason
            1.a. part with reason about
               1.a.1. what cannot be otherwise
               1.a.2. what can be otherwise
            1.b. part with reason as its controller
               (1.b.1. spirit)
               (1.b.2. appetite)
        2. part not having reason

The argument is roughly the one in the Republic.

"Another nature in the soul would also seem to be without reason though in a way to share in it. For in the continent and the incontinent we praise their reason, i.e., the part that has reason, because it exhorts them correctly and towards what is best; but they evidently also have in them another part that is by nature something besides reason, conflicting and struggling with reason" (Nicomachean Ethics I.13.1102b). For what the parts of the soul are, Aristotle accepts a version of the Tripartite Theory we saw in the Republic. He thinks that "the part of the soul having reason" consists in two parts:

• a part with reason
• a part with reason as its controller

As we will see in the next lecture, the "part with reason" itself consists in two parts:

• a part that reasons about what cannot be otherwise
• a part that reasons about what can be otherwise

Aristotle does not introduce these parts now to prevent details from obscuring the argument.

Similarly, although Aristotle elsewhere accepts that the part with reason as its controller divides into spirit and appetite (as Plato makes Socrates argue), he does not introduce this division in the Nicomachean Ethics because he does not want details to obscure the argument.

Virtues of Thought and Character

Aristotle divides the virtues into two kinds: virtues of "thought" and virtues of "character."

"The part that has reason has two parts, one that has authority in itself, and one that listens as to a father. The distinction between virtues reflects this difference. Some are virtues of thought and others are virtues of character (ἠθικάς)" (Nicomachean Ethics I.13.1103a). ⊕ The adjective ἠθικάς is a genitive form of ἠθικἠ, which transliterates as "ēthikē" and is the root of the word ethical.

If we recall this passage from the Republic, we can begin to see what Aristotle has in mind.

  "Then, wouldn't these two parts also do the finest job of guarding the whole soul and the body against external enemies--reason by planning, spirit by fighting, following its leader, and carrying out the leader's decision through its courage?
  Yes, Socrates, that is true.
  And it is because of the spirited part, I suppose, that we call a single individual courageous, namely, when it preserves through pains and pleasures the declarations of reason about what is to be feared and what isn't.
  That is right.
  And we'll call him wise because of that small part of himself that rules in him and makes those declarations and has within it the knowledge of what is advantageous for each part and for the whole soul, which is the community of all three parts.
  Absolutely, Socrates" (Republic IV.442b).

Reason has authority in itself. It declares, and spirit is supposed to follow these declarations.

One Virtue is the Best

At this point in his argument, Aristotle has made some progress. He thinks he has shown that

• the human life that achieves the best good is a life of activity of the soul
in conformity with virtue, or if there are several virtues, in conformity
with the best and most complete.

In the conditional here, Aristotle thinks the antecedent "there are several virtues" is true. He assumes there are virtues of character and of thought. So, for him, it follows that

• the human life that achieves the best good is a life of activity of the soul
in conformity with the best and most complete virtue.

We need to know what Aristotle thinks "the best and most complete" virtue is. He never identifies it explicitly, but there is an indication in Book X of Nicomachean Ethics.

⊕ "If happiness is activity in accord with virtue, then it is reasonable that it should be activity in accord with the best virtue; and this is the virtue of the best part of us. Whether the best part of us is intellect, or whatever else seems in accord with nature to rule and lead us and to think what is noble and divine, this itself being divine or as being the divinest part of us, the activity of it in accord with its fitting virtue will be complete happiness; and that is an activity of contemplation (θεωρητική), as we have said" ⊕ The "as we have said" here is puzzling. The Nicomachean Ethics, as we have it, contains no such previous statement. (Nicomachean Ethics X.7.1177a).

Aristotle here seems to be following the line of thought Socrates traces in the Republic.

In the Republic, reason (the rational part in the Tripartite Theory) is what in a just soul "rule[s] and lead[s] us" and "think[s] what is noble and divine." This thinking is the activity of contemplation. For Aristotle, as for Plato, "wisdom" (σοφία) is necessary for this activity.

The Search for More Answers

This itself does not tell us very clearly what a life with the best is good is. We need to know

• what Aristotle thinks is true of a human being when he is wise

In addition, we need to know

• what he thinks the second best virtue is
• what he thinks is true of someone who has this virtue

I try to explain Aristotle's answers to these questions in the next two lectures, but it helps first to summarize the crucial steps in his argument as we are now understanding it.

Crucial Steps in the Argument

Aristotle thinks reflection shows that we should understand ourselves as trying to achieve something when we live our lives in the ways we do. This something is the "best good," and Aristotle thinks there is general agreement about what this is. It is happiness.

Aristotle thinks that to know what a life with happiness is, we can appeal to the function we possess as the kind of beings we are. We are human beings. We act in a distinctively human way in the circumstances we face. He thinks that our actions as human beings are "action[s] of the part of the soul having reason" ⊕ These virtues are not sufficient. Aristotle says, as we have seen, that "to be happy takes a complete lifetime."

He insists on other conditions too.

"Happiness evidently also requires external goods. We cannot do fine actions if we lack the resources. For, first of all, in many actions we use friends, wealth, and political power just as we use instruments. Further, deprivation of certain externals--for instance, good birth, good children, beauty--mars our blessedness. For we do not altogether have the character of happiness if we look utterly repulsive or are ill-born, solidary, or childless; and we have it even less, presumably, if our children or friends are totally bad, or were good but have died" (Nicomachian Ethics I.9.1099a).

"He who is happy requires in addition to the goods of the body, external goods and the gifts of fortune, in order that his activity may not be impeded through lack of them. Those who say, if a man be good, he will be happy even when on the rack, or when fallen into the direst misfortune, are intentionally or unintentionally talking nonsense" (Nicomachean Ethics VII.14.1153b).

The function argument motivates the necessity of "resources" for happiness. A knife cannot not perform its function well if it never has the opportunity to cut. and that there is a set of virtues we must possess for these actions to constitute a life of living well and thus of "complete" happiness.

In outline, then, we can understand Aristotle's argument in the following way.

He introduces something he calls the human function. He uses this function to define the possible lives a human being can live, and he identifies virtues of thought and character to narrow down these lives to the ones in which we live well and are most happy.

This is pretty much the strategy in the argument we saw Socrates give in Plato's Republic.

Perseus Digital Library:

Plato, Euthydemus, Republic
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics

Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon:
ἐνέργεια, energeia, noun, "activity"
ἔργον, ergon, noun, "work"
εὐδαιμονία, eudaimonia, noun, "happiness"
ἠθική, ēthikē, adjective, "moral"
μακάριος (derivative of μάκαρ, epitaph of the gods in Homer, Iliad I.339), makarios, adjective, "blessed"
σοφία, sophia, noun, "wisdom"
σοφός, sophos, adjective, "wise"
τέλειος, teleios, adjective, "having reached its end, finished, complete"
τελειοτάτην, teleiotatēn, adjective, superlative of τέλειος

Arizona State University Library. Loeb Classical Library:
Aristotle, Parts of Animals

"Aristotle thinks objects have a function. We can readily understand what he means in the case of artifacts: they are constructed the way they are constructed to fulfill a certain task or to exhibit a certain kind of behavior. Fulfilling this task or exhibiting this behavior is their function. ... ⊕ Aristotle, like Plato before him, extends the notion of function to natural objects, especially to living things. In addition, Aristotle thinks that the capacity of an object to behave in this characteristic way depends on its organization, structure, and disposition, indeed, he thinks that it is just this disposition or organization that enables the object to behave the way it does. Now, for Aristotle, the form is this disposition or organization, while the matter is what is thus disposed or organized" (Michael Frede, "Individuals in Aristotle," 65-66. Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 49-71. University of Minnesota Press, 1987).